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In law, as in life, there is a good deal of ambivalence about playing.  Play, as the 
portal to innovation and creativity, can be the enemy of settled expectations and 
predictability. In the recent case of Locke v. Davey,1 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, appealed to “play in the joints” metaphor famously used in Walz v. Tax 
Commission of N.Y.2 as an aid in constitutional balancing of apparently competing 
constitutional religion clause claims, saying: 
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 72 U.S.L.W. 4206, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (2004)
2
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely 
straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, 
which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none 
commanded, and none inhibited.  The general principle deducible from the 
First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will 
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These two clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause, are frequently in tension.  Yet we have long said that ‘there is 
room for play in the joints’ between them.  In other words, there are 
some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not 
required by the Free Exercise Clause.3
One of the more important tasks of law is to define and defend the expectations 
we loosely call rights,4 consequently it is unsettling to find “play” as an operant feature of 
a legal rule describing the interaction of two important constitutional clauses -- the clause 
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental 
interference with religion.  Short of those expressly proscribed 
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a 
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without 
sponsorship and without interference.”  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of 
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
3
 72 U.S.L.W. at ___; 124 S.Ct at 1313
4
 I say “loosely-called rights” not because I will be contending that the term is very vague, but 
because one could coherently take a position that the expectations discussed in this article, 
particularly those in the discussion regarding conditioned benefits at section III infra, do not rise 
to the level of right but are more properly viewed as “expectations” or “privileges.”   These 
arguments will be addressed in the aforementioned section.   Suffice it to say, for the purposes of 
the introduction that it will be contended in that section that the consequences of such 
disappointed expectations need not rise to the level of right to have legal consequences in this 
instance.
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prohibiting the establishment of religion and the clause guaranteeing rights to the free 
exercise of religion.
Specifically, in the Locke case, the “play” arose when a governmental 
disbursement that benefited a religious institution passed muster under the establishment 
clause because of the intervention of a private choice by an individual.  Such sanitizing 
choices are a key determinant for a line of establishment clause cases, most recently 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,5 that found government disbursements to religious 
organizations via such choices constitutional.  Hereinafter such choice mechanisms will 
be termed “Zelman choices” for convenience. 
I will argue in this article that Locke is an exemplar of the new generation of 
Establishment clause cases that have written into law a sort of safe harbor, private choice, 
for governmental benefits that find their way into
5
 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
